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Abstract
I consider the elicitation of ambiguous beliefs about an event and show how to
identify the interval of relevant probabilities (representing ambiguity perception) for
several classes of ambiguity averse preferences. The agent reveals her preference for
mixing binarized bets on the uncertain event and its complement under varying betting
odds. Under ambiguity aversion, mixing is informative about the interval of beliefs. In
particular, the mechanism allows to distinguish ambiguous beliefs from point beliefs,
and identifies the belief interval for maxmin preferences. For ambiguity averse smooth
second order and variational preferences, the mechanism reveals inner bounds for the
belief interval, which are sharp under additional assumptions. In an experimental
study, participants perceive almost as much ambiguity for natural events (generated
by the stock exchange and by a prisoners dilemma game) as for the Ellsberg Urn,
indicating that ambiguity may play a role in real-world decision making.
Keywords— ambiguity aversion, binarized score, belief elicitation, interval probability,
subjective expectation, uncertainty aversion
JEL codes: D81, D82, D83.
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1 Introduction
Most economic modeling is based on subjective expected utility (SEU) (Savage, 1954). How-
ever, uncertainty often cannot be represented by a precise probability measure. Instead, the
perception of uncertainty is ambiguous (Knight, 1921). Initiated by Ellsberg (1961), var-
ious experiments show that such ambiguity matters for decision making. (For surveys on
ambiguity sensitive decision models see Etner et al., 2012; Machina and Siniscalchi, 2014;
Trautmann and van de Kuilen, 2015).
While there exist many experimental studies with artificially generated ambiguity, the
application of ambiguity sensitive models in empirical studies is difficult without means to
measure ambiguity perception.
1.1 Illustration: A simple mixing bet
In this paper, I propose a simple mechanism that is informative about the ambiguity of a
natural event E. In its simplest form, the elementary building block of the mechanism is the
choice between
[Eq] a lottery that pays with probability q if the event E realizes (“betting on the event”),
[Cq] a lottery that pays with probability 1− q if the the event E does not realize (“betting
on the complement”), and
[Mq] a lottery that pays with probability q(1− q) (“mixing”).
The choice [Mq] can be interpreted as probabilistic mixture of option [Eq] and option [Cq]
that does not dependent on the potentially ambiguous event E.1 The value associated with
each of the choices depends on q and is illustrated in Figure 1.
Under expected utility, the value of [Eq] and [Cq] is linear in q. Further, the decision
maker is indifferent between the mixture [Mq] and its elements [Eq] and [Cq] if those have
equal value. The best response is the choice [Eq] for large q and [Cq] for large 1− q. There
exists no q such that the choice [Mq] is the unique best response. The value 1−q at which the
decision maker switches between the choice [Eq] and [Cq] can be used to elicit the subjective
probability p.
The same holds true for probabilistically sophisticated preferences (Machina and Schmei-
dler, 1992), where each choice is associated with a probability of payout that is transformed
with a monotone value function. The difference in value between the three choices are subject
to a monotone transformation, and the best response remains unaffected.
1 Here, I argue within the Anscombe-Aumann framework and assume that prospects can be evaluated
based on the distribution they induce on the outcome space. The main part of the paper will treat the state
space as the interaction of an ambiguous source created by the unknown event and an unambiguous source
created by the randomization device (compare e.g. Ergin and Gul, 2009; Strzalecki, 2011; Webb, 2017).
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Figure 1: The value of the three choices [Eq], [Cq], and [Mq] depending on 1 − q. The left plot
illustrates the utility functional under SEU, the middle plot under probabilistically sophisticated
preferences, and the right plot under ambiguity averse preferences. In this example, the subjective
probability is p = 0.3, and the probabilistically sophisticated values are based on a probability
weighting function w(p) = exp(−(− ln(p))3/4) (compare Prelec, 1998). Under ambiguity aversion,
the ambiguous choices [Eq] and [Cq] are less attractive and the choice [Mq] is the unique best
response for any 1− q in the interval M .
Under ambiguity aversion, the value of the choice [Mq] remains unchanged, the ambiguous
choices [Eq] and [Cq], however, are less attractive. Thus, the choice [Mq] is the best response
for some interval M of values 1 − q. For ambiguity averse preferences, the interval M at
which the decision maker prefers [Mq] is related to ambiguity perception and ambiguity
attitude. In particular, the set M contains the probability p associated with ambiguity
neutral preferences. Further, the set M is larger for more ambiguity averse preferences.
Without additional structure, ambiguity aversion cannot be separated into ambiguity
attitude and perception. In the following, I define and identify ambiguity perception in the
form of an interval of beliefs for specific classes of ambiguity averse preferences.
1.2 Separation of ambiguity perception: The belief interval
To understand the empirical content of decision models, it is crucial to separate perception
and attitude (Manski, 2004). Let us consider the task of identifying the set of probabilities
that potentially influence an agent’s decision. I call the range of probabilities that are
necessary to describe the agents behavior the belief interval. Preferences are said to exhibit
ambiguous beliefs if the belief interval is not a single point. The following representations for
preferences over acts l that depend on an uncertain event E allow to define a belief interval.
The classical subjective expected utility (SEU) by Savage (1954) can be represented with a
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single probability p in the unit interval and a utility function u by
Ep[u(l)].
The non-ambiguous beliefs for SEU preferences reduce to a single point p. Other models
require ambiguous beliefs for their representation. Maxmin expected utility (maxmin) by
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) can be represented with a belief interval B = [a, b] by
min
p∈B
Ep[u(l)].
The more general variational preferences by Maccheroni et al. (2006) can be represented
with a positive cost function c by
min
p∈B
Ep[u(l)] + c(p).
In second order decision models, ambiguity aversion is defined as aversion to uncertainty
on the expected utility. Such ambiguity averse second order smooth preferences by Klibanoff
et al. (2005) can be represented with a probability measure P on the unit interval and a
concave second order utility function φ by
Ep∼P[φ(Ep[u(l)])].
For second order preferences the belief interval B is the support of the probability measure
P. Other ambiguity averse preferences, e.g. biseparable preferences (Ghirardato and Mari-
nacci, 2001) that include α-maxmin (Ghirardato et al., 2004; Marinacci, 2002) and Choquet
expected utility (Schmeidler, 1989), do not allow for a similar separation of a belief interval
from ambiguity attitude.
For the elicitation of the belief interval, consider the following mechanism that contains
the prospects [Eq], [Cq], and [Mq] from Section 1.1 as special cases. The agent is endowed
with lottery tickets, where each ticket represents a fixed probability to win a prize (e.g., a
monetary reward). The agent has to bet each ticket on the event or its complement. If the
event realizes, the agent obtains the tickets placed on the event multiplied by the odds of
the event. Otherwise, she obtains the tickets placed on the complement multiplied by the
odds of the complement. This task is called a mixing bet and it is repeated with different
odds, where one instance is randomly selected for payout.
The lottery tickets guarantee robustness with respect to the unknown utility function
(Smith, 1961), if one is willing to assume that the randomization device is perceived as
independent and objective lottery. Paying out only one mixing bet with specific odds is
meant to prevent hedging across the repeated betting tasks (see Azrieli et al., 2018; Bade,
2015, for discussions on validity and further references). If the normalized odds are above
the belief interval, the best response is to bet all tickets on the event. Reversed, if the
normalized odds are below, the best response is to bet all tickets on the complement. Under
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the ambiguity averse preferences considered above, mixing (betting tickets on the event and
the complement) is a sufficient condition for the normalized odds being in the belief interval.
Beliefs are ambiguous (i.e., they do not reduce to a single probability level) if and only if
the agent mixes for at least two different odds. Thus, ambiguous beliefs can be identified by
eliciting mixing behavior for different betting odds.
As the interval of mixing odds lies within the belief interval, the belief interval can be
bounded from within. For maxmin preferences, the bounds are sharp. Under second order
and variational preferences with sufficiently strong ambiguity aversion, the mixing interval
recovers the belief interval for large utility differences between the prizes.
In a small laboratory experiment, the mechanism is applied to events generated by an
Ellsberg urn, the German stock exchange, and by another participant’s behaviour in a pris-
oners dilemma game. As expected, ambiguity perception is highest for the ambiguous colour
in the Ellsberg Urn and lowest for the risky colour. After observing additional draws from
the urn, ambiguity perception reduces. Interestingly, ambiguity perception for the stock ex-
change and the social event, generated in the prisoners dilemma, is almost as large as for the
ambiguous colour, which indicates the importance of considering ambiguity when analysing
related decisions.
1.3 Related literature
The contribution of this paper is the introduction of an applicable mechanism to elicit ambi-
guity perception under a wide range of ambiguity averse preferences. Related work obtains
more powerful identification results (including under ambiguity seeking preferences) at the
expense of generality across decision models or simplicity of the mechanism. Bose and Daripa
(2017a) extend the mechanism introduced by Karni (2009) to α-maxmin preferences. In an-
other paper Bose and Daripa (2017b) introduce a mechanism that identifies the distribution
of beliefs for second order preferences.
Baillon et al. (2018) propose indices of ambiguity attitude and perception based on match-
ing probabilities (Dimmock et al., 2015) for three mutually exclusive events and their pairwise
unions. Baillon et al. (2019) show that their index is insightful under a wide range of am-
biguity sensitive models. However, their index of ambiguity perception is not applicable for
binary events. Li et al. (2018) apply the method in a trust game and Anantanasuwong et al.
(2019) to elicit ambiguity perception about different assets from a sample of investors.
Other work focuses on the revelation of dynamic information structures. Chambers and
Lambert (2018) discuss the truth-telling mechanisms for dynamic elicitation of subjective
probabilities of a potentially information receiving agent. Karni (2017) provides elicitation
of subjective probabilities on the set of of arising posteriors in the dynamic context, which is
also applicable for the ambiguity model introduced in Karni and Safra (2016). Karni (2018)
applies a similar approach for graded preferences (see Minardi and Savochkin, 2015).
So far, applied studies rely mostly on proxies for ambiguity. Brenner and Izhakian (2018)
use the marginal distribution of intra day data, Anderson et al. (2009) the disagreement
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between professional forecasters, and Rossi et al. (2017) the deviation between probabilistic
forecast and realization. Gallant et al. (2018) employ a Bayesian approach in a structural
model that features inter-temporal second order preferences (Klibanoff et al., 2009).
In the next section, the key findings of the paper are summarized. For technical details
see Section 3, where the mixing behavior under different preferences is derived. Sections
3.1 to 3.3 cover maxmin, variational, and second order preferences respectively. Section 4
discusses extensions to beliefs about real-valued variables, Section 5 provides an experimental
pilot study, and Section 6 concludes. Proofs are provided in the appendix. A supplementary
document discusses biseparable preferences, general ambiguity averse preferences (Cerreia-
Vioglio et al., 2011), and the elicitation of ambiguity attitude for α-maxmin preferences.
2 Mixing bets and the belief interval
Consider the task of eliciting beliefs about an event E from an agent with unknown prefer-
ences. The state space is given by S = {E,Ec} × [0, 1], where any state s ∈ S describes the
realization of the event E and the independent random draw r of the elicitation mechanism.
The agent’s preferences  are defined on acts l : S 7→ X that assign an outcome to each
state. The set of all acts is denoted by F .
Throughout the paper, some kind of aversion to ambiguity is assumed within one of
several ambiguity sensitive preferences.
Regularity Conditions 1 (ambiguity aversion). The agent has ambiguity averse smooth
second order or variational preferences, where the random draw r is independent from E and
uniformly distributed.
Essentially, Regularity Condition 1 imply expected utility for the lottery (risk) and ambi-
guity aversion for acts that depend on the event E. Regularity Conditions 1 contain maxmin
preferences as a special case. Note that the assumption on the random draw r has to be
formulated differently depending on the preference class at hand.2 Similarly, the exact defi-
nition of ambiguity aversion depends on the class of preferences. For details see Regularity
Conditions 3 for maxmin, Regularity Conditions 4 for variational, and Regularity Conditions
5 for second order preferences.
The belief interval is defined as the range of relevant probabilities.
Definition 1 (belief interval). The belief interval B is defined as the smallest closed interval
that contains all relevant probability levels for a representation of the preferences.
Heuristically, the belief interval B denotes the relevant probabilities p that the agent con-
siders when making decisions related to the uncertain event E. Section 3 provides details on
the uniqueness of the belief interval. Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011) formulates a general repre-
sentation of a wide range of ambiguity averse preferences with U(l) = minp∈B G(Ep[u(l)], p).
2 See Klibanoff (2001) for behavioral definition of independent randomization devices.
6
Klibanoff et al. (2014) provide a behavioral definition of relevant probabilities in smooth
models that coincides with the belief interval for maxmin and second order preferences.
For SEU preferences, the belief interval B = {p} is unique. Ambiguity averse preferences,
however, take into account a range of probability levels.
Definition 2 (ambiguous beliefs). Preferences are said to exhibit ambiguous beliefs about
the event E if the belief interval B is not a single point.
The elementary building block of the elicitation mechanism can be described as follows.
1. The agent chooses the ratio x of lottery tickets that she bets on the event E (and the
remainder 1− x on its complement Ec).
2. If the event E realizes, the agent receives xq lottery tickets. If the event Ec realizes,
the agent receives (1− x)(1− q) lottery tickets.
3. The agent is rewarded with the fixed prize w if her ticket amount exceeds a random
variable r that is uniformly distributed on [0, 1].
Note that the choices [Eq], [Cq], and [Mq] introduced in Section 1.1 can be recovered with
x = 1, x = 0, and x = 1 − q. Formally, a mixing choice x can be associated with an act in
F . Let 1(A) denote the indicator function for an event A.
Definition 3 (mixing bet with odds quota q and prize w). The mixing bet with mixing
choice x ∈ [0, 1], odds quota q ∈ [0, 1] and prize w ∈ X is defined as the act
l(x, q, w) : S → R : (E, r)→ w · 1(r ≤ (xq1(E) + (1− x)(1− q)1(Ec)).
The two potential outcomes of this mixing bet are w and 0. Throughout, it is assumed
that the agent prefers to obtain the prize w. The mixing interval M describes all odds for
which the agent is mixing between the the event and the complement.
Definition 4 (mixing interval M). Let x∗(q) : [0, 1] → [0, 1] define an optimal mixing for
the odds ratio q such that
l(x∗(q), q, w)  l(x, q, w)
for all x ∈ [0, 1]. The mixing interval M is defined as the smallest closed interval that
contains
{q ∈ [0, 1] | x∗(1− q) ∈ (0, 1)}.
Trivially, the optimal mixing ratio is x?(q) = 1 (betting all lottery tickets on E), if the
quota q is large enough. The resulting act is [Eq], a lottery with probability q if the event
realizes. Similarly, the optimal mixing is x?(q) = 0 (betting all lottery tickets on Ec), if
the quota q is small enough. The resulting act is [Cq], a lottery with probability 1 − q if
the complement realizes. Both acts depend on the potentially ambiguous event E. If the
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Figure 2: Example of optimal mixing x∗ for odds q ∈ {0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1}
that reveals ambiguous beliefs. The shaded area marks inner bounds on the belief interval B.
agent bets x?(q) = 1 − q on the event, the resulting act is [Mq], a lottery with probability
q(1 − q) irrespective of the uncertain event E. The ambiguity cancels out. An ambiguity
averse agent prefers to mix between the two events to hedge against ambiguity. The higher
the ambiguity aversion, the stronger is the optimal mixing drawn towards 1− q. The main
result of the paper establishes that such mixing implies ambiguous probabilities.
Theorem 1 (belief interval). Under Regularity Condition 1 mixing for a quota q implies
that 1− q is an element of the belief interval.
M ⊂ B.
In particular, if an agent mixes for two different quotas the agent holds ambiguous beliefs.
Theorem 1 is established in Section 3 for each class of preferences separately. This result
allows to bound the belief interval from within.
The set of values of 1 − q for which the agent chooses [Mq] is a subset of the mixing
intervalM . Thus, the simple choice from Section 1.1 is sufficient to bound the belief interval.
However, the mixing interval M provides sharper bounds for the belief interval. Figure 2
illustrates how observed choices for different odds provide information about the beliefs. In
this example, the agent holds ambiguous beliefs, as she is mixing for multiple odds. Further,
the position of the interval is consistent with low probabilities for the event E ranging at
least from 0.2 to 0.4.
Small mixing intervals can only be detected if appropriate odds are applied. For ambigu-
ous beliefs such odds always exist.
Theorem 2 (ambiguous beliefs). Under Regularity Conditions 1, beliefs are ambiguous if
and only if there exist at least two separate odds q for which the agent prefers to mix.
The identification result for the belief interval B can be strengthened further. Additional
considerations allow to separate the belief interval (ambiguity perception) from the ambiguity
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attitude. Under maxmin preferences, it holds that
M = B.
For variational preferences, an unbounded utility difference u∆ = u(w) − u(0) and a
bounded first derivative of the cost function c establish that there exists a utility difference
u∆ such that
Mu∆ = B.
For second order preferences, a uniformly positive ambiguity aversion guarantees that the
mixing interval Mu∆ approximately recovers the belief interval B for large utility difference
u∆. It holds that
Mu∆ → B for u∆ →∞.
3 Optimal mixing
First, consider the best response to the betting mechanism for an agent with SEU preferences.
Regularity Conditions 2 (SEU). The agent has SEU preferences with a belief p ∈ [0, 1]
about the event E. In particular, the preferences can be represented by
U(l) = EE∼p[u(l(E))]
for some strictly increasing utility function u.
Throughout the paper, it is assumed that the agent holds accurate beliefs about the
independent uniform draw that is used in the mechanism to induce risk neutrality. Hence,
fully accurate the representation above is
U(l(E, r)) = E(E,r)∼p×U [0,1][u(E, r)] = EE∼p[Er∼U [0,1][u(E, r)]].
For notational convenience, the distribution of r is not stated explicitly. The best response
under SEU is
x?(q) = arg max
x∈[0,1]
EE∼p[ u(1(sq(x,E) > r)w) ],
where sq(x,E) = xq1(E) + (1− x)(1− q)1(Ec).
In a first step, the analysis can be simplified with a key result from binarized scoring
rules (compare e.g., Hossain and Okui, 2013).
Lemma 1 (binarized score). For any score s in the unit interval, the expected utility of a
lottery payout based on the score s is a positive affine transformation of the expected score
EE∼p[u(1(s > r)w)] = EE∼p[s]u∆ + u0,
with u∆ = u(w)− u(0) and u0 = u(0).
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Figure 3: Optimal response for SEU preferences with belief p = 0.3.
Under Lemma 1 the optimal mixing behaviour for SEU preferences is independent of the
agent’s utility function.
Lemma 2 (SEU). The optimal mixing under SEU preferences (denoted under Regularity
Conditions 2) is
x∗(q) =

1 if p > 1− q
[0, 1] if p = 1− q
0 if p < 1− q.
The proof of Lemma 2 is straightforward as the maximization problem can be rewritten
with Lemma 1 as
x∗(q) = arg max
x∈[0,1]
EE∼p[sq(x,E)],
which is linear in x.
The optimal mixing for SEU preferences is illustrated in Figure 3. Mixing is optimal if
and only if 1 − q equals the subjective probability p. Otherwise, betting all lottery tickets
on one event is optimal. If the elicitor observes x(q)∗ = 1, it follows that p > 1 − q. For
x(q)∗ = 0, it follows that p < 1− q. Thus, observing betting choices for different odds q, it
is possible to identify the belief p.
The remainder of this section considers the best response to the betting mechanism for
more general decision models.
3.1 Maxmin preferences
This section establishes the optimal mixing for maxmin preferences with belief interval B.
Regularity Conditions 3 (maxmin). The agent holds maxmin preferences with belief in-
terval B = [a, b] about the event E. In particular, the preferences can be represented by
U(l) = min
p∈B
EE∼p[u(l(E))]
10
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Figure 4: Optimal response for maxmin preferences with ambiguous belief interval B = [0.1, 0.8].
The shaded area marks the belief interval, which is identified by the mixing behavior.
for some strictly increasing utility function u.
The set of measures B is unique (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989, Theorem 1) and the belief
interval is well-defined. As a special case, maxmin preferences contain SEU preferences if
the beliefs are unambiguous with B = {p}.
Lemma 3 (maxmin). The optimal answer for maxmin preferences as in Regularity Condi-
tions 3 is
x∗(q) =

1 if 1− q < a
1− q if a < 1− q < b
0 if b < 1− q
Lemma 3 follows from the more general statement for variational preferences in Lemma
4. See Lemma 1 in the supplementary document for α-maxmin preferences.
Interpreting betting behavior for maxmin preferences is straightforward. If everything is
betted on the complement Ec, the belief interval B is below 1 − q. If everything is betted
on E, the belief interval is above 1 − q. Finally, if mixing is observed, the belief interval
contains 1− q.
3.2 Variational preferences
This section establishes the mixing behavior under variational preferences (Maccheroni et al.,
2006), which generalize multiplier preferences (Hansen, 2007; Hansen and Sargent, 2007). We
assume variational preferences with belief interval B.
Regularity Conditions 4 (variational preferences). The agent has variational preferences.
In particular, the preferences over acts l(E) can be represented by
U(l) = min
p∈B
EE∼p[u(l(E))] + c(p)
11
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Figure 5: Optimal response for variational preferences. The optimal mixing is continuous in q. Six
examples are shown, where the belief interval is B = [0.1, 0.8] throughout. The left plot depicts
multiplier preferences with c(p) = θR(p||0.5) and θ = 0.1, 0.5, 1.5, where R is the relative entropy
function. The right plot depicts variational preferences with c(p) = θ|p− 0.5|4 and θ = 1, 10, 100.
for some strictly increasing utility function u and some grounded, strictly convex and twice
continuously differentiable cost function c : B → R.
Note that Regularity Conditions 4 covers variational preferences as defined in Mac-
cheroni et al. (2006) if they are twice continuously differentiable and strictly convex on
{p ∈ [0, 1] | c(p) <∞}. Define a cost function cc(p) by
cc(p) =
c(p) if p ∈ B∞ if p /∈ B
and U(l) = minp∈[0,1] EE∼p[u(l(E))] + cc(p). The minimal cc is unique and the belief interval
B is given by the closure of {p ∈ [0, 1] : cc(p) <∞}.
Lemma 4 (variational preferences). If the agent follows variational preferences as in Reg-
ularity Conditions 4 with belief interval B = [a, b], the optimal mixing for a mixing bet with
prize w is
x∗(q) =

1 if 1− q < a
mw(1− q) if a ≤ 1− q ≤ b
0 if b < 1− q
for a continuous function mw and it holds that
• mw(1− q) ∈ (0, 1) for c′(1− q)/u∆ < 1− q < 1 + c′(1− q)/u∆,
• mw(1− q) increasing if c′′(1− q) < u∆, and
• mw(1− q) decreasing if c′′(1− q) > u∆.
If c′ is bounded and u∆ is unbounded there exists a prize w such that the mixing interval
identifies the belief interval,
Mu∆ = B.
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Figure 6: Optimal response for second order ambiguity averse preferences. The optimal mixing
is continuous in q and lies in the shaded rectangle. Three examples are shown, where u(0) = 0,
u(w) = 1, the second order distribution P = U [0.1, 0.8] and the second order utility function is
Φ(z) = −e−θz with θ = 1, 4, 16 respectively.
3.3 Smooth second order preferences
This section considers the outcome dependent smooth second order preferences (compare
Ergin and Gul, 2009; Klibanoff et al., 2005; Nau, 2006; Seo, 2009).
Regularity Conditions 5. The agent holds beliefs P in form of a distribution over [0, 1] with
support B = [a, b] with 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ 1 about the event E and has ambiguity averse smooth
second order preferences. In particular, the preferences over acts l(E) can be represented by
U(l) = Ep∼P[φ(EE∼p[u(l(E))])]
for some strictly increasing utility function u and some strictly increasing, concave, and twice
continuously differentiable second order utility function φ.
The agent acts like a SEU type for linear φ functions. The second order probabilities
P are almost surely unique and the belief interval is unique across representations. See
Klibanoff et al. (2014) for a theoretical discussion on capturing the perception of ambiguity
under second order preferences and beyond.
Lemma 5. The optimal mixing for a mixing bet with prize w of an ambiguity averse agent
with second order preferences as in Regularity Conditions 5 is
x∗(q) =

1 if a < 1− q
mw(1− q) if a ≤ 1− q ≤ b
0 if 1− q > b,
for some increasing and continuous function mw(·) such that for all w
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• mw(1− a) = 1 and mw(1− b) = 0
• mw(1− q) < 1 if 1− q > Ep∼P[p] and mw(1− q) > 0 if 1− q < Ep∼P[p].
In particular it holds for the mixing interval that Ep∼P[p] ∈ Mu∆. Further, if the coefficient
of ambiguity aversion α(z) = −φ′′(z)
φ′(z) is bounded away from zero, it holds that
Mu∆ → B for u∆ →∞.
The continuity of m implies that the agent is mixing on an interval with positive length.
For sufficiently strong ambiguity aversion second order preferences are essentially identical
to maxmin preferences (Klibanoff et al., 2005, Proposition 3) and the belief interval can
be identified with a high degree of accuracy. Lemma 5 shows that the same effect can be
generated by increasing the utility difference u∆ = u(w) − u(0) if one is willing to assume
strictly positive ambiguity aversion.
In Figure 6 three examples with different constant absolute ambiguity aversion are shown.
Bounds on the belief interval are conservative for moderate rates of ambiguity aversion and
low utility difference in prizes.
4 Ambiguous beliefs over real-valued variables
Naturally, the belief interval and mixing bets can be extended to real-valued outcome vari-
ables. Consider the task of eliciting beliefs about a real-valued variable Y : Ω → R. The
state space is given by S = R× [0, 1]. Let P denote a set of distributions over the real line.
Further, let P0 ⊂ P denote the set of relevant distributions, which I call the belief set. As
before, preferences are said to exhibit ambiguous beliefs about the random variable Y if the
belief set does not reduce to a unique probability measure.
The belief set for SEU preferences is simply the subjective probability distribution of
Y . Other preferences, like maxmin preferences cannot be represented without taking into
account the expected utility of a decision with respect to multiple probability measures.
Such beliefs are called ambiguous.
The agent is confronted with mixing bets for a series of events Ei ⊂ R. Let [ai, bi] denote
the bounds elicited for event Ei. Let us denote the set of probability distributions that is
consistent with the obtained bounds as
P∗ = {P ∈ P|P(Ei) ∈ [ai, bi] for all i}.
It follows that P0 ⊂ P∗. Consider as example the situation where the random variable Y
is assumed to be bounded by c, C ∈ R with c ≤ Y ≤ C P-almost surely for every P ∈ P0.
If mixing bets are applied to the events Ei = {ω ∈ Ω|Y (ω) ≤ ci} for some constants
c < c1 < · · · < ck < C, any element of the belief set P0 has a cdf that lies in the gray area in
Figure 7. While unambiguous beliefs can be determined to an arbitrary degree of accuracy
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Figure 7: Bounding the set of cdfs in P0 with mixing bets based on the events Y ≤ ci for i = 1, 2, 3.
by increasing the number of thresholds ci, the bounds on ambiguous beliefs are conservative
without additional assumptions.
An ambiguous belief over an event E = {Y ≤ c} implies ambiguous beliefs about Y .
The reverse is generally not true. However, if the beliefs about the random variable Y are
ambiguous, there always exists a threshold c such that the agent holds ambiguous beliefs
over E = {Y ≤ c}.
5 A Pilot Experiment
In a small pilot laboratory experiment, which was based on OTree and was conducted at the
Frankfurt Laboratory for Experimental Economic Research (FLEX), 43 subjects could win
a prize of 10 Euros and were asked to judge the event of a specific type of ball being drawn
from an urn which contains 90 balls, where the color composition (60 red, 30 blue) was
known to the participants, but the number of pointed balls (0 - 60 pointed) was unknown to
the participants. The participants could only apply the three choices x ∈ {0, 1− q, 1} from
Section 1.1. Preferences were elicited pairwise to reduce complexity.
Participants were asked to play a standard prisoners dilemma before the main experiment.
During the main experiment, mixing choices were elicited for five different domains. The
event of a blue ball being drawn (risk), the event of a dotted ball being drawn (ambiguity),
the event of the stock market rising from the beginning to the end of the experiment, the
event of the assigned co-player in the prisenors dilemma choosing to defect. Finally, the
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Figure 8: Ratio of positive ambiguity perception. The plot depicts the ratio of individuals
for each topic that exhibit positive lower bounds for the length of the belief interval.
participants were shown 10 draws from the Ellsberg Urn and had to repeat the dotted ball
elicitation.
The results in Figure 8 show that about 45% of the participants show evidence of ambi-
guity perception for the artificial ambiguous event (the dotted ball) by preferring to mix for
at least two of the elicited q values. For the risky urn draw (the blue ball), only 15% of the
individuals did so.
Figure 9 proxies the probability level associated with the reports in form of the midpoint
of the elicited belief interval. Throughout, the answers suggest rational beliefs with the urn
being close to 13 . After the 10 additional draws the average belief moves toward the true
value of 110 .
The main goal of the elicitation mechanism is to reveal ambiguity perception beyond
experimental tasks. The two examples considered here indicate that “natural events”, where
uncertainty is generated by mechanisms beyond the experimental control, are indeed per-
ceived as ambiguous by a considerable ratio of participants that are averse to this perceived
ambiguity. Interestingly, the stock market induced less risk than the social ambiguity that
arose in the prisoners dilemma. The latter is almost as likely to induce multiple mixing as
the “fully ambiguous” Ellsberg Urn.
Additional experiments are currently conducted.
6 Discussion
The separation of persistent attitudes and temporary perception is a potentially insightful
endeavor. Mixing bets can be used to elicit belief intervals and subsequently analyze their
impact on decision making as well as their development under changing information environ-
ments. Conveniently, the mechanism can be used within a whole range of ambiguity averse
attitudes. For ambiguity seeking preferences, however, mixing bets are uninformative about
the length of the belief interval.
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Figure 9: Midpoint of belief interval. The plot depicts the average midpoint of the belief
interval across individuals for each topic.
Elicitation of subjective probabilities is often done by matching probabilities (e.g., Holt,
2007) also called choice-based probabilities (Abdellaoui et al., 2011). In this approach, the
probability of an event E is defined by the point of indifference between a lottery that
pays a winning prize with probability p and a lottery that pays the same prize if E realizes.
Conveniently, matching probabilities can be analyzed without a mixing concept or a product
state space.
As already pointed out in Ramsey (1931) and de Finetti (1931) an obvious measure of
belief is willingness to bet. Preceding ambiguity sensitive decision models in economics,
Smith (1961) proposes to define subjective probabilities by the interval of odds that an
agent agrees to bet on a certain event. By allowing the agent to mix bets, I extend Smith’s
hypothetical design and establish that multiple mixing identifies ambiguity.
The introduced mixing bets have a direct connection to proper scoring rules and can be
seen as an application of multiple point forecasting as introduced in Eyting and Schmidt
(2018) to binary events. The betting mechanism can be restated as binarized asymmetric
piecewise linear score for a point forecast of the random variable 1(E). The best response
is a quantile of the underlying distribution, where the level of the quantile depends on the
odds quota (compare e.g. Gneiting, 2011). As pointed out in Chambers (2008), the best
response to proper scoring rules under maxmin preferences is equal to the best response
to one element of the set of probabilities. This finding extends to mixing bets, where the
quantile is 1 for large and 0 for small quantile levels.
A major concern is whether the agent acts differently if multiple odds are elicited and one
is randomly selected for payout instead of just one choice being elicited. The validity of this
random lottery procedure has been shown to falter for simple choices (Starmer and Sugden,
1991). In the ambiguity averse context, an additional concern is how the agent reacts when
faced with multiple bets on the same uncertain outcome. The application of our results
require the agent to apply the ambiguity aversion on each bet separately instead of hedging
across bets. This point, however, arises necessarily in the elicitation with random devices
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for ambiguous averse agents (compare Bade, 2015) and similarly arises for other elicitation
mechanisms (e.g., Baillon et al., 2018; Bose and Daripa, 2017a).
Another concern is that the validity of the mechanism depends on the existence of a
randomization device for the lottery payout that is perceived as risk without ambiguity.
Similar issues arise for mechanisms that elicit matching probabilities (Baillon et al., 2018)
or that employ objective lotteries (Bose and Daripa, 2017a,b).
Instead of revealing preferences as proposed here, one can ask directly for ranges of
probabilities (e.g., Giustinelli and Pavoni, 2017; Manski and Molinari, 2010). However,
ambiguity averse decision models describe behavior, rather than thought processes. The
belief interval may well have considerable explanatory power regarding an agents behavior,
while the agent is unable to explicitly articulate such an interval.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. The expected utility can be expressed as a linear function of the probability of
winning,
EE∼p[u(1(s > r)w)] = P[s > r]u(w) + (1− P[s > r])u(0) = P[s > r](u(w)− u(0)) + u(0).
Further, from the independent uniform distribution of r and as s ∈ [0, 1] it follows that
P[s > r] = EE∼p[Er∼U [1(s > r)]] = EE∼p[s].
Proof of Lemma 4. We apply Lemma 1 and obtain the simplified optimization problem
x? = arg max
x∈[0,1]
min
p∈B
sq(x, p) + c(p)/u∆.
The decision maker acts as if more ambiguity averse for higher utility difference between prizes
u∆ = u(w) − u(0) (Proposition 8, Maccheroni et al., 2006). Define ct(p) = c(p)/u∆ for notational
convenience. ct is also grounded, strictly convex and twice continuously differentiable.
Examine the minimum of
g(p) = sq(x, p) + ct(p) = 1− x− q + xq + p(x− (1− q)) + ct(p). (1)
The function g is convex. For fixed x, the minimum at p∗ is characterized by the first order condition
g′(p∗(x)) = x − (1 − q) + c′t(p∗(x)) = 0. It holds that c′ is increasing by the convexity assumption
and it follows that p∗(x) is decreasing in x.
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• First case: p∗(x) = a ⇐⇒ x > 1− q − c′t(a)
The agent values the resulting bets as a function of x by
U(x) = sq(x, a) + ct(a) = 1− a− q + aq + x(a− (1− q)) + ct(a). (2)
Thus, x? = 1 if 1− q < a. For 1− q > a, consider the following two sub-cases:
– If c′t(a) < 0, it follows that x∗ = min(1, 1− q − c′t(a)).
– If c′t(a) > 0, it follows that x∗ = max(0, 1− q − c′t(a)).
• Second case: p∗(x) = b ⇐⇒ x < 1− q − c′t(b)
The agent values the resulting bets as a function of x by
U(x) = 1− b− q + bq + x(b− (1− q)) + ct(b). (3)
Thus, x? = 0 if 1− q > b. For 1− q < b, consider the following two sub-cases:
– If c′t(b) > 0, it follows that x∗ = max(0, 1− q − c′t(b)).
– If c′t(b) < 0, it follows that x∗ = min(1, 1− q − c′t(b)).
• Third case: p∗(x) ∈ (a, b) ⇐⇒ x = 1− q − c′t(p∗(x))
The agent values the resulting bets as a function of x by
U(x) = min
p∈B
sq(x, p) + ct(p) (4)
= min
p∈B
1− x− q + xq + p(x− (1− q)) + ct(p) (5)
= 1− x− q + xq + p∗(x)(x− (1− q)) + ct(p∗(x)). (6)
The first order condition is
−(1− q) + p∗(x)′x+ p∗(x)− p∗(x)′(1− q) + c′t(p∗(x))p∗(x)′ = 0
−(1− q) + p∗(x) + p∗(x)′(x− (1− q)) + c′t(p∗(x))p∗(x)′ = 0
−(1− q) + p∗(x)− p∗(x)′c′t(p∗(x)) + c′t(p∗(x))p∗(x)′ = 0
p∗(x)− (1− q) = 0.
And describes a maximum as U ′(x) > 0 ⇐⇒ p∗(x) > 1−q and p∗(x) decreasing in x. Thus,
it follows that x?(1− q) = 1− q − c′t(1− q). The mixing function x? is increasing in q if
c′′t (1− q) > 1.
For any point 1− q, mixing is optimal if
0 < x?(1− q) < 1 (7)
c′t(1− q) < 1− q < 1 + c′t(1− q) (8)
c′(1− q)
u∆
< 1− q < 1 + c
′(1− q)
u∆
, (9)
which holds true for a sufficiently large u∆ if c′ is bounded.
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Proof of Lemma 5. For notational convenience define sq(x, p) = EE∼p[ sq(x,E) ]. With Lemma 1 it
holds that
x?(q) = arg max
x∈[0,1]
Ep∼P[φt(sq(x, p)) ],
with φt(z) = φ(u∆z + u0) increasing and concave and sq(x, p) = 1− p− q + pq + x(p− (1− q)).
First, consider the case 1− q ≤ a. As p ≤ 1− q implies φt is increasing in x, this case implies
that φt is P-almost surely increasing in x. Thus, Ep∼P[φt(sq(x, p)) ] increasing in x and x∗ = 1. A
similar argument shows x∗ = 0 for 1− q ≥ b.
The remainder of the proof considers the case a < 1− q < b. Let U(x, q) = Ep∼P[φt(sq(x, p)) ].
As φt is continuously differentiable, φt and its first two derivatives are integrable on B, it follows
by the dominant convergence theorem that ∂x∂xU(x, q) = Ep∼P[φ′′t (sq(x, p))(p − (1 − q))2], which
in turn implies that U(x, q) is concave in x as φ′′t ≤ 0. We conclude that for fixed q the optimal
mixing x∗(q) is unique. Further, by the maximum theorem (Ok, 2007) x?(q) is continuous as it
holds that U(x, q) is continuous by the dominated convergence theorem.
If a 6= b the following argument shows that mixing is optimal for an interval that contains
1− Ep∼P[p]. Consider the first order condition ∂xU(x, q) = Ep∼P[φ′t(sq(x, p))(p− (1− q))] = 0. For
x = 1, the equation above is equivalent to Ep∼P[φ′t(pq)(p−(1−q))] = 0. As φt concave, the derivative
φ′t is decreasing and it follows that φ′t(pq) ≤ φ′t(bq) almost surely. Thus, Ep∼P[φ′t(pq)(p− (1− q))] ≤
φ′t(bq)(Ep∼P[p]− (1− q)) < 0, for 1− q > Ep∼P[p]. Analogously, it can be followed that the FOC for
x = 0 is positive if 1− q < EE∼p[p]. As x∗(1− q) is continuous on the belief interval B, it follows
that mixing is optimal in an environment of EE∼p[p] if B doesn’t reduce to a single point.
Now consider a series wn such that u∆,n = u(wn)−u(0)→∞. The utility function is not unique
(compare Theorem 1 Klibanoff et al., 2005). If preferences are represented by utility functions
un(0) = 0 and un(wn) = 1, the agent acts identical to a decision maker with transformed φn(z) =
φ( zu∆,n + c0). The coefficient of ambiguity aversion for this rescaled agent is
αn(z) = −φ
′′
n
φ′n
= −u∆,nφ
′′(u∆,nz + u(0))
u2∆,nφ
′(u∆,nz + u(0))
= α(z)
u∆,n
,
where α(z) = −φ′′(z)φ′(z) is uniquely defined coefficient of ambiguity aversion. It holds that αn+1 > αn.
If α(z) is bounded away from zero, it holds that infz αn(z)→∞. With Proposition 4 in Klibanoff
et al. (2005) it follows that for large n the preferences are essentially identical to maxmin preferences.
Lemma 3 establishes that those have mixing interval M = B.
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